Raymond A. Kelly and Mildred C. Kelly v. Wendell Scott et al : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1955
Raymond A. Kelly and Mildred C. Kelly v. Wendell
Scott et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lewis S. Livingston; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Kelly v. Scott, No. 8403 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2429
I·AY E~ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT lAW LIBiaAtH 
IL 81 U~ 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F. ILE"f~ " -··· .. 
FEB 2 0 195b 
RAYMOND A. KELLY and _______________ -------------··--··- ----··· 
MILDRED C. KELLY, Clerk, Sup n1e Court, Utt~.:-:l 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
WENDELL SCOTT, ANNE SCOTT, 
and WILLIAM H. THAYNE, dba 
THAYNE & COMPANY, 




LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON, 
Attorney for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............... ·-·····--····---------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON______________________________________________ 4 
ARGUMENT: 
Point 1. ·--·····························-···········-·····-······························---··------------ 5 
Point 2. ············-·····-···-·······································-·············---------------------- 7 
Point 3. ··-···············-·····························-······-·······················-----------·-·----- 9 
Authorities 
Statutes: 
Rule 60(b) (5) (6) and (7). 
Texts: 
Am. Jur., Vol. 31, Sec. 430. 
Am. Jur., Vol. 30, Sec. 208. 
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice, Sec. 1330, Sec. 1321. 
Moore, Federal Practice, Vol. 6, Page 4020, Vol. 7, Sec. 60.26, 
P. 275. 
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Sec. 887 A. 
Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 261. 
Cases Cited: 
Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F. ( 2d) 242. 
Klapprott v. U. S., 335 U. S. 601. 
Butler v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 240, 11 S. Ct. 985, 35 L. Ed. 713. 
Van Tassel v. Lewis, 118 U. 356, 222 P. (2d) 350. 
Tucker v. Dougherty Roofing Co., 137 S. \V. (2d) 884. 
Murphy v. Schuster, 111 So. 427. 
:Mcintyre v. Ajax Mining Co., 60 P. 552, 20 U. 323. 
Bank of America v. Engleman, 225 P~ (2d) 597. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND A. KELJ_jY and 
MILDRED C. KELLY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
- vs.-
WENDELL SCOTT, ANNE SCOTT, 
and WILLIAM H. THAYNE, dba 
THAYNE & COMPANY, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
~J.lhis is an action brought by the plaintiffs as sellers 
under a real estate sales agreement dated June 6, 1953 
(admitted as an exhibit herein) wherein the defendants 
Scott are buyers and the defendant Thayne is the real 
estate agent. Pursuant to said agreement Scott entered 
into possession of the property on the 20th day of June, 
1953, having made the down payment described in the 
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agreement. During the next three and a half months 
the buyer remained _in possession and made certain 
alterations to the property including the installation of 
drapery rods, later removed. Prior to the entrv of 
possession, plaintiff performed certain decorating to th<-~ 
special order of the buyer. About the middle of Sep-
tember 1953 the buyer having been unable to supply the 
balance of the purchase price as provided in said agree-
ment, this action was originally started by the service 
of summons only. On October 1, 1953 the original com-
plaint was filed asking for restoration of the premises, 
reimbursement for damage to the property during the 
term of possession, and damages for breach of the agree-
ment including an $800.00 real estate commission. The 
amounts paid by the buyer on the agreement \vere at all 
times held by the defendant Thayne. Subsequent to the 
entry of default judgment and issue of execution for 
restoration of the premises, plaintiff and defendant 
Scott entered into a stipulation dated November 11, 1953 
whereby they agreed that plaintiff, seller, was entitled 
to $115.00 per month for the period of the occupancy 
of the defendant Scott. It was further agreed that 
Thayne was authorized to restore to Scott all of the 
sums represented by the purchase price which it had 
held except the sum of $800.00 claimed by it for real 
estate commission and by plaintiff as an element of 
damage and the further sum of $500.00 claimed as 
damage by the seller, and to pay plaintiff the stipulated 
rental. The defendant Thayne \Yas at this time made a 
party to the action by service upon him of an amended 
complaint, asking that he be required to set forth his 
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claim. This procedure was pursuant to stipulation be-
t\veen plaintiff and Scott. By answer to the amended 
complaint, Thayne admitted the obligation to pay the 
real estate commission and consented that judgment be 
entered in accordance with the prayer of the amended 
complaint. On March 4, 1954, the defendant, Scott, hav-
ing failed to answer the amended complaint, upon motion 
of Thayne, judgment by default \vas entered awarding 
plaintiff judgment against Scott for $1300.00 and award-
ing to defendant, Thayne, a judgment ''over'' in the 
amount of $800.00 against the plaintiff Kelly, represent-
ing the real estate commission. On June 5, 1954, satis-
faction of judgment was filed, the money having remained 
at all times in the possession of Thayne. On August 21, 
1954, Scott filed a motion to vacate the default judgment 
on the theory that defendant, Scott, \Vas not in fact in 
default, since by the amended complaint no new issues 
\vere made \Vi th respect to him and no answer vvas re-
quired. On February 7, 1955 the motion to vacate the 
default judgment \Vas heard and order entered vacating 
said judgment. On l\!Iarch 9, 1955 the matter was tried 
(before a division of court not previously involved in 
any of the foregoing matters) and judgment entered in 
favor of defendants, Scott, against plaintiff for $1300.00. 
Simultaneously judgment \Vas entered in favor of plain-
tiff against rrhayne for $800.00 representing the real 
estate commission. On March 23, 1955 upon motion of 
Thayne an order \Yas entered amending the previous 
order of February 7, 1955 to recite that the original 
default judgment was vacated only as to the defendant 
Scott on the theory that Thayne was never properly in 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the law suit, since there was no issue as to him in the 
amended complaint. Later, upon motion of Thayne, the 
judgment of ~larch 9, 1955 was amended to vacate the 
judgment of $800.00 in favor of Kelly against Thayne 
on the theory that the original default judgment of 
March 4, 1954 constituted an adjudication of the issue 
of the real estate commission. Plaintiff appeals from the 
judgment against him of the full amount of $1300.00, the 
order vacating the judgment in his favor against Thayne 
of $800.00, and the order denying his motion to vacate 
the original default judgment of March 4, 1954. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. Blaintiff was entitled to an order vacating the 
default judgment of March 4, 1954 in its entirety, that 
portion constituting a judgment ''over'' in favor of 
Thayne, being a judgment based upon a prior judgment 
which had been ''satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based having been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, and it being no longer 
equitable that a judgment should have prospective ap-
plication'' within the meaning of rule 60b (6) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The original sales agreement was a valid sub-
sisting agreement not conditioned upon the obtaining of 
a loan for its discharge. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to damages for restoring the 
condition of the premises irrespective of the agreement. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1. At the outset, there can be no argu-
ment but that the record clearly shows from the stipu-
lation of the original plaintiff and defendant and the 
amended complaint that the whole purpose of bringing 
the defendant Thayne into the law suit was for the pro-
tection of the plaintiff respecting the issue of the $800.00 
real estate commission. The default judgment entered 
March 4, 1954 at the solicitation and instigation of 
Thayne must stand or fall in its entirety. That portion 
which purports to award a judgment "over" is based 
upon the other portions of the award within the meaning 
of rule 60b ( 6). The only reason Scott was thereafter 
able to obtain the vacation of this judgment subsequent 
to the running of the time permitted therefor was be-
cause the judgment was void, within Rule 60b (5). It is 
submitted the judgment was void in its entirety. Our 
rule, except for ·the addition of subsection ( 4) is the 
same as Federal Rule 60B and reference must necessarily 
be made to the Federal Rules for the construction there-
of. The court, in denying plaintiffs' motion to vacate 
the original default judgment, was impressed with the 
fact that a year had transpired since the entry of the 
original default judgment and the motion to vacate the 
same. Appellant emphasizes that the period between 
the very novel and intricate procedure by which Thayne 
obtained his order correcting the order setting aside the 
default judgment to refer to just the portion thereof 
against Scott and the filing of the motion to vacate the 
default judgment in its entirety was little more than 
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sixty days, to-wit: 67 days. It is further submitted that 
the time interval to be used as a test for determining 
whether plaintiff moved for the vacation . of the judg-
ment within a reasonable time is this shorter period. 
That a reasonable time is the only test for the making 
of this motion reference is made to Moore, Federal Prac-
tice, Volume 7, Section 60.26, Page 275: 
"Because of the basis for relief under clause 
( 5) the rule quite naturally provides that the 
only time limitation under clause (5) is that it 
be made within a ' 'reasonable' ' time. . . . The 
reasonable time should be applied to the end that 
substantial justice is done. This means that the 
movant should be given ample time under all the 
circumstances within which to make his motion.'' 
Clause (5) of the federal rule is our clause (6). 
Construing this rule the case of Tozer vs. Cha.rles A. 
Krause Milling Company, 189 F. (2d) 242 to the effect 
that rule 60 (B) should be given a liberal construction, 
says that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
petition to set aside the judgment so that the case can 
be heard on its merits. In the instant case the action 
was heard on its merits and a result contrary to the 
default was a\varded. Clearly the whole basis of the 
judgment was subverted and rendered null and void. 
The entire foundation of that part of the judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff is, to the judicial knowledge of the 
court, without any validity force or effect and ought 
never to have existed. This is exactly the situation to 
which rule 60B is aimed. That this rule should be fol-
lo\ved to do substantial justice and without regard to 
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strict construction of pleading (as to construe the 
amended complaint as authorizing a consent judgment) 
reference is made to the land-mark case of Klapprott vs. 
United States, 335 U. S. 601 at Page 614 where the Court 
denies the contention that rule 60B is abrogated by strict 
analysis of pleading and says : 
''To accept this contention would introduce 
needless confusion in the administration of rule 
60-B and would also circumscribe it with needless 
boundaries. Furthermore, 60-B strongly indicates 
on its face that courts no longer are to be hemmed 
in by uncertain boundaries of these and other 
common law remedial tools. In simple English, 
the language of the "other reasons" clause for 
all reasons except the five particularly specified 
vests power in courts adequate to enable them to 
vacate judgments whenever such action is appro-
priate to accomplish justice.'' 
This case suggests that relief from the original 
default judgment as to the portion not previously vaeated 
should be given pursuant to either of the final two sub-
sections of rule 60-B. 
POINT NO. 2: The trial court was of the opinion 
that the description of the purchase price as being ''cash 
to a maximum loan'' rendered the contract unenforceable 
as being subject to a condition precedent to liability 
thereon. It is submitted that this phrase should not be 
so construed since the buyer was in effect agreeing to 
pay a given purchase price for the property by making 
a down payment thereon and agreeing to pay the balance 
in cash over and above such amount as he, the buyer, 
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might be able to raise by real estate mortgage loan. No 
particular amount was specified. Conceivably a loan of 
a very nominal amount would have been a "maximum" 
loan. It is submitted the clause in the contract was not 
an aleatory promise over which the parties had no con-
trol or over which the seller had any control but was 
rather wholly within the province of the buyer to negoti-
ate. As pointed out in Williston on Contracts, Revised 
Addition, section 887 A, a promise might be construed as 
a condition barring liability where the necessary event 
is peculiarly within the control and power of the promisee 
or where the cooperation of the promisee is required. It 
is submitted that in this case the evidence will show that 
although that cooperation was given, it was in fact the 
failure of the promissor only that was here involved. It 
is submitted that the fact that no words of condition, as 
usually considered, are present in this contract since the 
evidence shows (cross examination of Mrs. Scott) that 
buyer at all times material had the necessary resources 
to discharge the purchase price. It would not be fair to 
say that the parties intended the words to constitute a 
condition even though the contract might normally be 
considered to be conditional upon its face. The parties' 
intention 'vould negative this conclusion. That this con-
struction is justified see Malden Knitting Mills vs. U. S. 
Rubber Company, 16 N.E. (2d) 707. This court has held 
in the case of VarnTassel vs. Lewis, 118 U. 356, 222 P. 
(2d) 350, that even use of the words "in consideration 
of" do not constitute a condition under appropriate cir-
cumstances. In the case of Tucker vs. Dougherty Roofing 
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Cornpany,. 137 S.W. (2d) 884 a contract for re-roofing 
cabins provided: ''cash on completion subj~ct _to ap-
proval of loan being negotiated at present time.'' This 
contract "\vas held not to be a conditional contract but 
merely a statement of terms as to mode of payment. It 
is submitted that this parallels our case. That courts 
favor such construction as opposed to conditions is 
apparent from the Restatement of Contracts, Section 261. 
This court in the case of Mcintyre vs. Ajax Mining Com-
pany, 60 P. 552, 20 U. 323, held that a contract for pay-
ment of money ''out of proceeds of ore sales, compro-
mise or otherwise'' was not conditional upon there being 
proceeds of ore sales or compromise. It is submitted 
that the contract with respect to mortgage loan is in-
tended to define the time of payment only. A reasonable 
time must necessarily be implied. Bank of America vs. 
Engleman, 225 P. (2d) 597. 
POINT NO. 3. It is submitted without argument 
that it was error not to award $300.00 damages for 
restoration of the premises after possession was sur-
rendered to plaintiff, since even if the contract was not 
enforceable as being subject to a condition or otherwise, 
the subsequent relationship between the buyer and seller, 
as even landlord and tenant, would demand that such 
award be allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted judgment entered herein 
March 9, 1955 in favor of Scott for $1300.00 and for 
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Plaintiff for $800.00 be reinstated, or, in the alternatiYe, 
that the original judgment of March 4, 1954 be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON, 
Attorney for Appellants. 
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